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CORPORATE SIGNATURES ON NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
By

NEIL

0.

LITTLEFIELD*

INTRODUCTION

A corporate signature must necessarily be executed by a natural person. Normally, the signature will include the name of the
corporate entity and the name of an individual. Where such a
signature appears on a negotiable instrument to designate an
obligor, the question arises: Who is liable? There are four possible
answers: The corporation, the individual, both, or neither. Had
the parties responsible for executing and accepting the instrument with such a signature verbalized their intent, it is conceivable that any of these four answers would have been given. However, such intent often is neither expressed verbally nor stated
clearly and unambiguously on the instrument. To insure the relatively routinized transfer of such instruments, there must be a
predictable, uncomplicated answer to the question of who is liable. On the other hand, prevention of unnecessary or unexpected
liability suggests that an individual examination of each transaction in context is appropriate to determine liability.
Article Three of the Uniform Commercial Code attempts to
articulate a set of rules' regarding the liability of signers of corporate instruments. However, an analysis of the case law to date
under the Code rules will show that the application of Code rules
does not result in the desired predictability. It is suggested that
the Code drafters have chosen relatively mechanical rules which
have an inherent logic which is out of touch with the patterns of
human conduct to which the rules apply.
The underlying problem with the Code approach to the question of corporate signatures arises out of its application of the
principle underlying the parol evidence rule. That rule, succinctly
stated, dictates that parol (outside) evidence is inadmissible to
vary or contradict the terms of a writing.' However, either by way
* Professor of Law, University of Denver; B.S., 1953, University of Maine; LL.B.,
1957, Boston University; LL.M., 1956, S.J.D., 1961, University of Michigan. The author
wishes to thank James Chalet for his assistance in researching this article.
U.C.C. §§ 3-401, 3-403, 3-404 (1972 version).
2 For a statement of the parol evidence rule, see, L. SIMPSON, CONTRACTS § 98 (2d ed.
1965). A more complete analysis will be found in Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53
YALE L.J. 603 (1944). The parol evidence rule for Article Two of the U.C.C. will be found
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of exception or because it falls outside a chosen definition of the
rule, it is clear that evidence is admissible to resolve an ambiguity
apparent from the writing.' The parol evidence rule applies, ipso
facto, to a negotiable instrument inasmuch as an instrument is
an integrated, written contract.' The Code rules to be discussed
recognize the ambiguity exception and state, in effect, that where
an ambiguity exists in the form of the signature, parol evidence
is admissible; otherwise it is not. As will be demonstrated, the
Code rules articulate a mechanical test to determine if an ambiguity exists; the mechanical test is then unfortunately combined
with the unnecessary protection of remote parties subsequently
acquiring the instrument.' The result is that, given an admitted
ambiguity, the remote purchaser is entitled to the most favorable
construction. Application of this latter rule forces courts either to
misapply the parol evidence rule in certain cases or to forego
prevention of unexpected and perhaps unnecessary liability.
A comment might be added here with regard to the fact that
this discussion focuses on corporate signatures. The principles of
the Code being discussed are equally applicable to other agency
situations. It is also true that the Official Comments to Code
section 3-4036 give examples where the agent, Arthur Adams,
signs on behalf of the principal, Peter Pringle. However, it is
assumed that the bulk of representative signatures involve a corporate entity. More than fifty cases under the Code involve corporate officers while less than a handful involve agents of individual
principals, trustees, and the like.
I. PRE-CODE LAW
Where a signature on a negotiable instrument indicated
ambiguity as to whether a principal or an agent or both were
signing, pre-Code cases presented a bewildering split of authority.
in § 2-202. It is not felt necessary for the purpose of this article to investigate in depth
the policies and varying interpretations of the rule.
3 L. SIMPSON, supra note 2, § 101.
See U.C.C. §§ 3-118 and 3-119 (1972) and Official Comment One to § 3-118.
One of the basic consequences of negotiability is that the holder in due course,
defined in U.C.C. § 3-302 (1972), takes free of defenses and claims of ownership, § 3-305.
This policy favoring remote purchasers is carried over into the cases interpreting § 3-403.
See text accompanying notes 95-106 infra.
I U.C.C. § 3-403 (1972) and Official Comment Three. Perhaps some of the unsatisfactory character of the Code rules is explained if the draftees were overimpressed with the
atypical situation, as indicated by Comment Three.
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The issue raised in most cases was to what extent and in which
situations parol evidence would be admissible for the'purpose of
determining liability. For those jurisdictions where the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law7 was in effect, the appropriate sections of the act were less than helpful. Section 19 of that act
simply recognized the efficacy in bending the principle, that the
signature of any party may be made by a duly authorized agent.'
Section 20, unhelpfully, provided:
Where the instrument contains or a person adds to his signature
words indicating that he signs for or on behalf of a principal, or in a
representative capacity, he is not liable on the instrument if he was
duly authorized; but the mere addition of words describing him as
an agent, or as filling a representative character, without disclosing
his principal, does not exempt him from liability.

A.

Liability of the Principal
It is not necessary, for the present purposes, to outline in
detail the case authority under the N.I.L.1 Cases and authorities
seemed to assume with little discussion that where the principal
is named and the agent is authorized the principal can be held
liable irrespective of whether the plaintiff is an immediate or a
remote party. 0 This result follows naturally from the language of
section 19 that "The signature of any party may be made by a
duly authorized agent ...

and the authority of the agent may be

established as in other cases of agency." No policy seemed to exist
to require that a named principal be bound only where a particular form of signature is used.
The converse was also well accepted: Where the principal is
not named on the instrument, parol evidence is inadmissible to
bind the principal on the instrument, even in those cases where
I The UNIFORM

NEGOTLLZ INSTRUMENTS LAW [hereinafter cited as the N.I.L.] is the

statutory predecessor of Articles three and eight of the U.C.C. It was promulgated by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1896 and was enacted
in all jurisdictions. The version used here is that found in J. BRANNAN, BEUtEL's BRANNAN
NEGoTuBiLE INsTRuMENTs LAW 209 (7th ed. 1948) [hereinafter cited as Beutel's Brannan].

N.I.L. § 19 provided: "The signature of any party may be made by a duly authorized
agent. No particular form of appointment is necessary for this purpose; and the authority
of the agent may be established as in other cases of agency."
I A good source of the cases decided under the N.I.L. can be found either in BEUrrEL'S
BRANNAN, supra note 7, or W. BmRrroN, Bm'rrON ON BiLLs AND NoTs (2d ed. 1961)
[hereinafter cited as W. BRMroN ].
10 W. BRITrON, supra note 9, § 162, and cases cited therein.
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the agent is authorized." This result follows even when the immediate parties both knew that the agent was signing on behalf of
the unnamed principal." This conclusion was said to flow necessarily from the language of section 18, which provided, that "No
person is liable on the instrument whose signature does not appear thereon ... "13 Application of the parol evidence rule to the
question of liability on the instrument, however, should not be
interpreted as prohibiting liability dehors the instrument. Cases
permitted suit against the principal on theories other than suit
on the instrument.
B. Liability of the Representative
Most of the litigated cases under the N.I.L. involved the
question of when an authorized agent would be able to escape
personal liability on the instrument through the introduction of
parol evidence to establish that the signature was intended to be
made only in a representative capacity. The language of section
20 provides little guidance and makes no distinction between
cases involving immediate parties and those involving remote
parties. Cases generally proscribed the use of parol evidence in
suits between remote parties where the agent had signed in an
ambiguous manner. 5 Assuming ambiguity on the face of the instrument, courts, applying (or not applying) section 20 of the
N.I.L., went their individual ways where litigation involved the
immediate parties to the instrument. Two types of situations can
be identified. In the first situation, the ambiguity was created
because the party represented was named, but there is a failure
to indicate that the individual signer was signing in a representative capacity. In the second situation, the party represented was
W.
"

BRITrON, supra note 9, § 167.

See cases cited in Bau.TnrL's BRANNAN, supra note 7, § 18, at 404.

The application of this principle has been less clear. See text accompanying notes
29-35 infra.
" See cases in W. BarrON, supra note 9, § 167 nn. 7-8, and BEUTEL'S BRANNAN, supra
note 7, § 18 at 404-06.
," See cases cited and discussion in W. BRrrrON, supra note 9, § 163, which, however,
suffers somewhat in not always making it clear whether the plaintiff was a payee or a
remote party. A more complete, but less organized presentation of cases is found in
BEUr EL's BRANNAN, supra note 7, § 20 at 411-33.

Courts were sometimes unclear or contradictory as to what constituted an ambiguity
for the purposes of the parol evidence rule. It appears unnecessary to pursue this issue,
under the N.I.L., for the purposes of this article.
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not named, but the individual signer indicated in some fashion
that it was a representative signature.
In a suit between the immediate parties, when the signer
named the party represented, most courts under the N.I.L. permitted the introduction of parol evidence to resolve the ambiguity
created by the absence of any indication of the representative
capacity."6
In the second situation, when the principal is unnamed but
some representative character is indicated, courts under the
N.I.L. also split where the action involved immediate parties.
Most cases barred parol evidence and held the signer individually
liable. 7 The minority rule is best known by the New York case of
Megowan v. Peterson.'5 In that case, the firm of Johnson & Peterson had entered into an agreement with its creditors whereby all
assets of the firm were transferred to Peterson, as trustee for the
firm's creditors. As trustee, Peterson undertook to complete the
firm's construction contracts. The note in question was issued to
the plaintiff (one of the firm's creditors), allegedly to pay for
lumber purchased to carry out the agreement with the creditors.
The note was signed "Charles G. Peterson, Trustee." In a suit to
enforce the obligation against Peterson individually, the trial
court dismissed the complaint after the introduction of parol evidence, and the plaintiff-payee appealed. The New York Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court explicitly on the ground that
there was conflicting evidence of the purpose of the purchase and
the plaintiff's knowledge of that purpose. It was held that the case
should have gone to the jury. However, the court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that the form of the signature bound the

11See generally BauTEL's BRANNAN,

supra note 7, § 20 at 411-33. This situation in-

volves signatures such as:
ABC Corporation
Prexy Preston
Peter Principal
Arthur Agent.
When the agent names the party represented, a bewildering and inexplicable pattern
emerges depending upon whether the agent is a corporate officer, corporate employee, a
simple agent, a trustee, or otherwise. See W. BarTroN, supra note 9, §§ 164-165. As the
U.C.C. has made such a distinction irrelevant, no further word need be said here. See
U.C.C. § 3-403(2)(b).
'1

W. Bnr-rON, supra note 9, § 164.

I" 173 N.Y. 1, 65 N.E. 738 (1902). This case is referred to in U.C.C. § 3-403, Comment
Three.
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defendant personally as a matter of law. Thus, Megowan stands
for the proposition that any ambiguity in the form of the signature which suggests representative signing permits the introduction of parol evidence between the immediate parties to resolve
the ambiguity. This result seems to fly in the face of the (admittedly less than determinative) language of N.I.L. section 20.
IH.

THE CODE APPROACH

Given the known split of authority existing under the N.I.L.,
it is surprising that the drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code
did not result in a more satisfactory resolution of the problem of
representative signatures on negotiable instruments. The existing
record of what the Code drafters or commentators had in mind is
sketchy. The 1952 draft of the Uniform Commercial Code attacked the problem of the personal liability of the representative
with a blunt instrument. Section 3-403(2) simply provided:
An authorized representative who signs his name to an instrument is also personally obligated unless the instrument names the
person represented and shows that the signature is made in a representative capacity. The name of an organization preceded or followed by the name and office of an authorized individual is a signature made in a representative capacity.

The policy
tion 20, is
authorized
the section

of the 1952 version, simply a rewording of N.I.L. secapparent. Unless the signature is unambiguous, the
agent is to be personally liable. As the Comment to
stated:

[Ilt excludes parole evidence for any purpose except reformation
The rule here stated is that the representative is liable personally unless the instrument itself clearly shows that he has signed
only on behalf of another named on the paper. If he does not sign in
such a way as to make that clear the responsibility is his .... 9

The 1952 version of section 3-403(2) had the advantage of
simplicity. However, it carried the policy of the parol evidence
rule to an extreme. This subsection was objected to by the New
York Law Revision Commission in 19560 as overturning the prior
majority rule where the signature was of the form,"ABC Corporation, Arthur Adams," and the New York (minority) rule of
Megowan, where the signature was of the form, "Arthur Adams,
" U.C.C. § 3-403, Official Comment Three (1972).
REPORT OF THE LAw REvLSION COMMISSION FOR 1956, at 408 (1956).
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Agent." The rule is too harsh on agents or officers, given what is
apparently wide-spread practice in signing in a representative
capacity. Professor Hawkland has suggested: "To most businessmen, a signature following the name of a corporation on a negotiable instrument clearly means that an officer of the company has
signed in his representative capacity, even though his name is not
followed by a description of his office or his agency status."2 ' At
least one case decided under the 1952 version of the Code2 held
parol evidence between the immediate parties inadmissible to
avoid the personal liability of an authorized officer where the
corporation was named, but the representative capacity was not
indicated.3
The present version of section 3-403, which remains unchanged since the 1956 version, is more receptive to the use of
parol evidence than was the 1952 version. The present version
reads in full as follows:
(1) A signature may be made by an agent or other representative, and his authority to make it may be established as in other
cases of representation. No particular form of appointment is necessary to establish such authority.
(2) An authorized representative who signs his own name to
an instrument
(a) is personally obligated if the instrument neither
names the person represented nor shows that the representative signed in a representative capacity;
(b) except as otherwise established between the immediate parties, is personally obligated if the instrument names
the person represented but does not show that the representative signed in a representative capacity, if the instrument does not name the person represented but does show
that the representative signed in a representative capacity.
W. HAWKLAND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL PAPER AND BANK DEPosrrs AND

CoLLEcrIONs 81 (1967).
2 Pennsylvania was the only jurisdiction to adopt a 1952 version of the U.C.C. Subsequently, Pennsylvania amended its code to conform to the 1956 version. The latter version
of the code resulted from the attempts of the Uniform Commissioners to respond to the
reactions of the New York Law Revision Commission. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 4 (1972) and authorities there cited.
23 In re Laskin, 204 F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1962). This case was reversed, In re Laskin,
316 F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1963) by permitting parol evidence under the equity powers of a court
in bankruptcy. Another Pennsylvania case of the period is indeterminate in its holding
inasmuch as the payee was dead and the testimony of the maker was inadmissable. See
Bell v. Dornan, 203 Pa. Super. 562, 201 A.2d 324 (1964).
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(3) Except as otherwise established the name of an organization preceded or followed by the name and office of an authorized
individual is a signature made in a representative capacity.

The Comments to the 1956 version were extensively rewritten to
conform to the inherent change in policy contained in section 3403.3 The Comments expressly mention the adoption of the preCode majority rule where the signature is made in the form,
"Peter Pringle, by Arthur Adams, Agent," (that is, where the one
who is represented is named) and of the adoption of the majority
rule where the signature is of the form, "Arthur Adams, Agent."2
However, the Comments have not been of as much help as they
could have been because they only speak of cases regarding principal and agent. But, of the nearly sixty litigated cases to date
under section 3-403, more than fifty involve signatures where the
party represented is a corporation." A discussion of the cases
litigated under the Code will reveal the weaknesses of the present
Code rules as applied to the corporate context.
A.

Liability of the Named Party Represented

Because the signature of an organization almost always must
be made by an individual,27 the question of the liability of the
organization necessarily requires the introduction of parol evidence. Even where the signature is of the classic representative
form, "ABC Corporation, By: Arthur Adams, Pres.," it is necessary to establish that Arthur Adams was authorized to sign on
behalf of ABC Corporation, before the corporation can be held
liable. This rule is articulated by section 3-403(1): "A signature
may be made by an agent or other representative, and his authority to make it may be established as in other cases of representation." Those few cases which have posed the issue are in accord
with the rule of this section. 8 One case, while not holding to the
1 Comment Three was also revised in 1966.
U.C.C. § 3-403, Official Comment Three (1972).
s Research has found fifty-seven cases involving clear legal issues necessitating the
application of § 3-403. Fifty-two of these cases involve an allegedly corporate signature,
one involves "an account," one an Elks Lodge, one a partnership, one an unexplained
"trustee," and only one involved a classical principal-agency relationship. The latter case
is First Nat'l Bank v. Maidman, 2 U.C.C.R. 1048 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965).
" An interesting exception may be provided by the facts of Walton v. William H.
Corby, Inc., 12 Ches. Co. Rep. 43, 33 Pa. D. & C.2d 703, 1 U.C.C.R. 271 (1963), where
the court opinion reports that the form of the signature on a note was simply, "Walter H.
Corby Inc. (SEAL)."
0 Jenkins v. Evans, 31 App. Div. 2d 597, 295 N.Y.S.2d 226 (5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1185)
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contrary, introduces unnecesssary confusion. In Chiles v. Mann
& Mann, Inc.,29 a note was signed, "Chiles Planting Co., By: E.B.
Chiles, Jr." While the issue litigated concerned only the individual liability of the signer,10 the court did comment that the form
of the signature "meant that Chiles Planting Company was the
trade name of E.B. Chiles, Jr., and he could not offer parol testimony to vary that meaning." '3' Insofar as that dictum states that
parol evidence would be inadmissible in a suit against a corporation entitled "Chiles Planting Company," it flies in the face of the
language of section 3-401(2) which reads: "A signature is made
by the use of any name, including any trade or assumed name,
upon an instrument, or by any word or mark used in lieu of a
written signature." The correct result is indicated in Nichols v.
Seale 2l where the party represented was named "The Fashion
Beauty Salon." The Texas Court of Civil Appeals, referring to the
above quoted section, properly stated: "Consequently, extrinsic
evidence was admissable to show that 'The Fashion Beauty
Salon' was an assumed name for 'Mr. Carl's Fashion, Inc.'"
It should be obvious from reading sections 3-401 and 3-403
that the question of the liability of the named party represented
is completely independent of the question of liability of the representative. As indicated, the liability of the party represented
depends upon that party being named plus a showing dehors the
instrument that the signing party was authorized to act on behalf
of the party represented. As will be seen, the question of personal
liability of the signer (the representative) is governed by 3-403(2).
Thus, it is incorrect to suggest that if the representative is liable,
the party represented is not. Part of the holding on this issue in
the lower court decision, Grange National Bank v. Conville,3 is
clearly wrong. In that case, the signature was in the form:
John P. Conville
Doris E. Conville
Hughesville Mfg. Co. Inc. (Seal).
(1968); and Musulin v. Woodtek, Inc., 260 Or. 576, 491 P.2d 1173 (10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
162) (1971).
" Chiles v. Mann & Mann, Inc., 240 Ark. 527, 400 S.W.2d 669 (1966).
30 See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra for discussion on that point.
" Chiles v. Mann & Mann. Inc., 240 Ark. 527, 531, 400 S.W.2d 667, 667 (1966).
493 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1973), rev'd on a procedural point, 505 S.W.2d
251 (1974).
3 5 Lyc. 170, 8 Pa. D. & C.2d 616 (1956).
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Apparently there was conflicting evidence as to the liability
of the Convilles, but the court stated: "We find, however, that the
Hughesville Manufacturing Company, Inc. is not liable on the
notes even though John L. Conville and Doris E. Conville may
have been authorized to sign for the company, for the notes do
not show that the signatures were made on behalf of the company."" The court could have reached this result only by assuming that the necessity of adding language to escape personal liability leads to the necessity of adding5 language to bind the party
represented. This is a non sequitur.
B.

Liability of Unnamed Parties

Section 3-401(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code is brief
and to the point: "No person is liable on an instrument unless his
signature appears thereon." The language is a continuation of the
law of the N.I.L.6 The principle on its face is sensible in that one
ought not to be liable on a negotiable instrument unless or until
one signs. After all, a basic requirement of a negotiable instrument under Article Three is a "signed writing. ' 37 However, where
an authorized representative has "signed" a negotiable instrument, why should not the party motivating the signing also be
liable? The Article Three principle is in contrast to the liability
of an undisclosed principal under agency law. There, the obligee
may hold the undisclosed principal liable even where the obligee
3
at the time of contracting did not know of the undisclosed party. 8
It is difficult to articulate a policy to support the rule that
an undisclosed principal cannot be liable on the note. Professor
Britton, in his discussion of section 18 of the N.I.L., simply states
that it codifies "the common law rule which rendered inapplicaId. at

-,
D. & C.2d at 620.
While it is true that the Conville case was decided under the 1952 version of the
Code, the point involved here was the same under both versions of the Code as well as
under the N.I.L. See Jenkins v. Evans, 31 App. Div. 2d 597, 295 N.Y.S.2d 226 (5 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 1185) (1968). There are very few cases where the liability of the named party
represented is at issue. Presumably, litigation only arises where the corporation is insolvent and personal liability of the representative is sought.
-"Section 18 of the N.I.L. reads, in part, as follows: "No person is liable on the
instrument whose signature does not appear thereon, except as herein otherwise expressly
provided." The last clause of § 18 referred to liability by virtue of collateral and virtual
acceptances (§§ 134-135) both abrogated by the Code. See U.C.C. § 3-401, Official Comment One (1972).
- U.C.C. § 3-104 (1972).
" See W. SEvvY, LAW OF AGENCY, § 56 (1964).
31
"
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ble to bills and notes the doctrine of undisclosed principal."3 He
points out that "[tihe rule has been applied in numerous
cases." 0 A quote from a cited case states: "This exception to the
rule is based upon the reason that each party who takes a negotiable instrument makes his contract with the parties who appear
on its face to be bound for its payment . . ...
"
It is submitted
that this begs the question. Why is each party who takes a negotiable instrument bound by the contract on its face? In analyzing
the policy, a distinction should be made between two situations.
In the first situation, an authorized agent has signed his name
with no indication of representative capacity. In the second situation, the authorized agent has signed his name and has indicated
that he is signing in a representative capacity such as by prefacing his signature with "By:" or by adding "Trustee," "Pres.," or
"Agent"-but has not named the party represented. In the second situation, parol evidence ought to be admissable to establish
both the name of the principal and his liability. After all, under
section 2-403(2)(b),4 2 the agent may introduce evidence to disprove personal liability. What further violation of the policy favoring integration of contracts on negotiable instruments occurs,
since the payee and holders have a right to assume that someone
is liable?
The clear language of the Uniform Commercial Code does
not prevent the holding suggested here. It is true that section 3401(1) says, "No person is liable on an instrument unless his
signature appears thereon." But it does not read, "No person is
liable unless his name appears thereon." Additionally, section 3401(2) says, "A signature is made by use of any name, including
a trade or assumed name . . . ." (emphasis added). Section 3403(1) says that an agent's authority to make a signature "may
be established as in other cases of representation." The definition
of "Signed" in Article One simply "includes any symbol executed
or adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate a
writing."43 Arguably, the clear language of the statute seems to
n W. BsrrrON, supra note 9, at § 167.
O Id.
" Pratt v. Hopper, 12 Cal. App. 2d 291, 55 P.2d 517, 518 (1936).
a See text accompanying note 58 infra.
U.C.C. § 1-201(39) (1972) (emphasis added).
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lead to a different result from that indicated in the Official Comment to 3-401 which reads in relevant part:
The chief application of the rule has been in cases holding that a
principal whose name does not appear on an instrument signed by
an agent is not liable on the instrument even though the payee knew
when it was issued that it was intended to be the obligation of one
who did not sign."

Assume an authorized representative signs an instrument
"Arthur Adams, Pres." Assume further that the party represented authorized Adams to use Adams' name as the principal's
5
name. Then, "Arthur Adams" would be the assumed name of
the principal and the principal could be bound on the instrument.
Why could not the same result be reached by presuming that
where the authorized representative signs "Arthur Adams,
Pres.," the party represented has authorized the agent to use that
name as the principal's? It is submitted that this logic would have
the desirable effect of erasing the illogic of the Megowan rule of
section 3-403(2)(b):41 After the agent shows that he did not intend
47
to sign personally, no one is liable on the instrument.
Only one case decided under the Code holds that parol evidence is inadmissable to establish liability of an unnamed corporate organization,"8 although a number of cases give lip service to
the rule. One of the cases seems to suggest the contrary. In
Dynamic Homes, Inc. v. Rogers,' the signature showed representative capacity through use of the word "by," 5 but failed to name
the corporation allegedly intended to be liable. The unnamed
corporation appealed a trial court judgment against it, arguing
u U.C.C. § 3-401, Official Comment One (1972) (emphasis added).
See U.C.C. § 3-403(2) (1972).
',See text accompanying note 18 supra.
, j. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 26, at 403 and n.10 points out the illogic of
that case, but assumes it to be compelled by the Code.
' Ness v. Greater Arizona Realty Co., 21 Ariz. App. 231, 517 P.2d 1278 (14 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 152) (1974).
'5 331 So.2d 326 (19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 560) (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
The signature in that case was as follows:
by /s/
Arthur J. Maas (SEAL)
by /s/
Janet H. Maas (SEAL)
/s/Arthur J. Maas (SEAL)
ARTHUR MAAS-Individually
/s/Janet H. Maas (SEAL)
JANET MAAS-Individually
Id. at 327 (19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 561).
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that it could not be liable on the note since it was not named on
it and that parol evidence was wrongly considered on the point.
The Florida District Court of Appeals, incorrectly discussing section 3-403(2)(b) and the Code adoption of the Megowan rule, 5'
assumed that parol evidence was admissable to establish that the
corporation was intended to be the party liable. However, the
court did hold that there was an absence of evidence that the
individual signers were authorized or that they intended to sign
in a representative capacity, and therefore reversed the judgment
against the corporation.
A second case seeming to apply the rule that an unnamed
principal cannot be held liable on the note is not good authority
on the point; the evidence clearly established that the parties
intended the note to be a personal obligation of the stockholders
only and not that of the corporation. 51 In a third case, section 3401(1) was applied where the unnamed party sought to be held
was an individual, and there was no indication of3 agency or the
name of the alleged principal on the instrument.
An interesting possible exception to the generally accepted
rule of section 3-401(1) is provided by what must be characterized
as a correct decision of the Illinois appellate court. 54 In that case,
a note was made payable to a corporation. It was in the hands of
the plaintiff bank which attempted to assert the rights of a holder
in due course.5 5 The defendant-maker asserted that the bank
could not be a holder in that the only indorsement on the back
of the note was in the form, "By Is! Eugene Tarkoff, Sec.Treas." Defendant did not "otherwise deny the plaintiff is the
owner of the note, nor

. . .

deny the validity of the signatures on

the note or the authority of Tarkoff" to act for the corporate
payee." The court properly phrased the issue as "whether or
not a note made payable to a corporation by its corporate name
can be legally endorsed by the signature of an individual fol31U.C.C. §

3-403(2)(d) (1956) and the Megowan rule properly relate only to the
personal liability of the representative, and are inapplicable to the question of whether or
not the party represented is liable. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
52 Potts v. First City Bank, 1 Cal. App. 3d 341, 86 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1970).
First Nat'l Bank v. Maidman, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1048 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965).
' American Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Scenic Stagelines of Savannah, Inc., 2 Ill.
App. 3d 446, 276 N.E.2d 420 (10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 416) (1971).
U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 3-305 (1956).
" American Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Scenic Stagelines of Savannah, Inc., 2 Ill.
App. 3d 446, 448, 276 N.E.2d 420, 422 (10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 416, 418 (1971)).
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lowed by a description of his position but without reference in
the endorsement itself to the entity for which he purports to
act. 5 7 In referring to section 3-403(2)(b), the court pointed
out that because the agent could escape liability, "there is a
strong inference . . . that where the note names the corporation
as payee that an endorsement signed by its agent in his own
name, followed by a description of his position, is a significant
indication that the individual signer is acting as an agent for
the named payee and that such endorsement is legally sufficient." 58 It was pointed out that to rule otherwise would be to
deprive the plaintiff bank of any rights. "Such a result would
seem to be untenable."59 The case is obviously correct and can be
distinguished from a holding that an unnamed principal cannot
be liable because the name of the principal did appear as payee
on the front of the note.
A few cases have been decided under the Code where the
unnamed party sought to be held was an individual."0 In all of
these cases, the courts routinely applied section 3-401(1) to hold
that the alleged obligors were not liable on the instrument. The
cases are correct even on a generous reading of section 3-401(2)
inasmuch as the parties did not intend that the individuals be
bound on the note. For example, in Jennaro v. Jennaro,1 an attempt to hold an individual as a guarantor of a corporate note
failed because the individual did not sign.
There is one clear exception to the rule that an unnamed
party will not be liable on the instrument. It is represented by
McCollum v. Steitz. 2 The note in that case was signed "/s/ W.
F. Hamrick, Desert Inn," followed by an address. The payee
plaintiff sued William Steitz and the evidence showed that the
note was signed as a partnership obligation of the Desert Inn and
that William Steitz was a partner. In holding that the nonsigning
partner was liable on the note, the California District Court of
Appeals pointed out: "One may be liable under a trade name
Id. at 449, 276 N.E.2d at 422 (10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 419).
Id. at 449, 276 N.E.2d at 423 (10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 419).
59 Id.
N Jennaro v. Jennaro, 52 Wis. 2d 405, 190 N.W.2d 164 (9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1259)
(1971); First W. Bank & Trust Co. v. Bookasta, 267 Cal. App. 2d 910, 73 Cal. Rptr. 257,
267 (5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1181) (1968).
11 52 Wis. 2d 405, 190 N.W.2d 164 (9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1259) (1971).
12 261 Cal. App. 2d 26, 67 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1968).
'"
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even though one's own name is not on the instrument.""3 The
result follows from partnership law that all partners are jointly
liable for partnership obligations. 4 There are pre-Code cases
under section 18 of the N.I.L. to the same effect.6 5 While it may
be argued that this results from partnership law, the real question
is the admissibility of parol evidence to establish the partnership,
the names of the partners, and the resultant liability of the unnamed partner. It would appear just as logical to admit parol
evidence where the signature was "Arthur Adams, Pres." to establish a corporate obligation and the name of the corporation.
Many courts faced with the problem of the liability of the
unnamed principal properly point out that relief may be had on
the underlying obligation. As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
said, "A note given in a transaction as collateral security is not a
bar to a suit on the primary obligation even though the primary
obligor did not sign the note.. . ."" This principle has been used
to hold an individual liable on the underlying obligation as a joint
venturer,6 7 and to permit suit against a nonsigning dominant
stockholder under the alter ego principle.6 However, the unnamed corporation will not be liable on the underlying transaction where parol evidence establishes that the payee of the note
never intended to hold the corporation liable, but relied entirely
on the liability of the individual signers.69
PersonalLiability of the Individual Signer

C.

Most cases in the corporate signatures area concern the question of when an individual signer is personally liable on the instrument. The basic rule is that where there is no ambiguity, the
question of liability will be determined without reference to parol
evidence. The corollary is that where the party has signed in an
ambiguous manner, parol evidence will be admissible to avoid
"

Id. at 29, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 706.

" See

J.

CRANE

& A.

BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP

§ 358 (1968).

Frazier v. Cottrell, 82 Ore. 614, 162 P. 834 (1917) and Locatelli v. Flesher, 220 Mo.
App. 447, 276 S.W. 415 (1925), cited in BEUTEL'S BRANNAN, supra note 9, at 406.
' In re Eton Furniture Co., 286 F.2d 93, 95 (3d Cir. 1961).
, McClung v. Saito, 4 Cal. App. 3d 143, 84 Cal. Rptr. 44 (7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 517)
(1970).
" First W. Bank & Trust Co. v. Bookasta, 267 Cal. App. 2d 1016, 73 Cal. Rptr. 657
(5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1181) (1968).
" Potts v. First City Bank, 7 Cal. App. 3d 341, 86 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1970).
"
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personal liability in an action between the immediate parties, but
not as to remote parties. The key issue is what constitutes an
ambiguity. While the articulated Code statement of the above
rules is an improvement on prior law 0 and reduces somewhat the
confusion and splits of authority, the drafters chose a rather inflexible rule. The pertinent section is 3-403(2) which reads:
An authorized representative who signs his own name to an instrument
(a) is personally obligated if the instrument neither names the
party represented nor shows that the representative signed in a representative capacity;
(b) except as otherwise established between the immediate parties, is personally obligated if the instrument names the party represented but does not show that the representative signed in a representative capacity, or if the instrument does not name the person
represented but does show that the representative signed in a representative capacity.

The Code is strangely silent on when the representative is not
personally obligated on the instrument. The matter is left to implication. It is true that subsection (3) states: "Except as otherwise established the name of an organization preceded or followed
by the name and office of an individual is a signature made in a
representative capacity." But nowhere is the reader of the statute
given a rule as to the effect of a representative signature. Clearly,
an additional sentence should read to this effect: "Where an authorized representative signs in a representative capacity, and
the represented party is named, the representative will not be
liable on the instrument." Courts are fairly uniform in assuming
such to be the intent of the draftsman, and have so held, where
the signature is in the form:
ABC Corporation
/s/ Arthur Adams, Pres.
or
Arthur Adams, Pres.
ABC Corporation"
70 See text accompanying note 15 supra.

7' Southeastern Financial Corp. v. Smith, 397 F. Supp. 649 (17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
1043) (N.D. Ala. 1975); First Nat'l Bank v. C & S Concrete Structures Inc., 128 Ga. App.
330, 196 S.E.2d 473 (12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 913) (1973); Phoenix Air Conditioning Co. v.
Pound, 123 Ga. App. 523, 181 S.E.2d 719 (9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 483) (1971); Grotz v.
Jerutis, 13 Ill. App. 3d 543, 301 N.E.2d 60 (12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1164) (1973); Bank of
Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Morse, 265 Ore. 72, 508 P.2d 194 (12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
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This result should follow whether the individual signer is sued by
an immediate party or a remote party. The principle is based
upon a clear policy that the writing is unambiguous and that
parol evidence cannot be admitted to contradict the plain meaning of the words.7 2 The implied rule of section 3-403(3) removes
some of the confusion which existed in pre-Code cases as some
courts had previously required
the representative to use "By" to
73
escape personal liability.
Two cases decided under section 3-403, both split decisions
of an appellate court, indicate that confusion continues to exist.
The cases are markedly similar and both involve multiple and
repetitious signatures. In Trenton Trust Co. v. Klausman,7 4 the
facts demonstrate the foolishness of the rule, "The more signatures, the better." In that case, the face of the note bore the
following:
The Shoe Rack
X Mark Klausman, Sec.
X Lionel Klausman, Vice Pres.
X Michael Klausman, Pres.

The back of the note was endorsed as follows:
X Mark Klausman, Sec.
X Lionel Klausman, Vice Pres.
X Michael Klausman, Pres.
The Shoe Rack
X Mark Klausman, Sec.

The trial court dismissed the complaint brought by the payee of
the note against the individuals Mark and Michael Klausman for
failure to state a cause of action. A majority of four of the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the trial court wrongfully dismissed the complaint without permitting evidence. The majority
pointed out that it was illogical for the corporation to endorse its
own note. Presented with this ambiguity, parol evidence was ap520) (1973); see also Bennett v. McCann, 125 Ga. App. 393, 188 S.E.2d 165 (10 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 851) (1972), and Security Ins. Co. v. Mangan, 250 Md. 241, 242 A.2d 482 (5
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 621) (1968).
712The remedy, if any, for the party who relied upon the individual liability of the
authorized representative is through the equitable remedy of reformation.
72 See discussion in BEurrEL's BRANNAN, supra note 7, at 413-15.
, 222 Pa. Super. Ct. 400,296 A.2d 275 (11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 787) (1972). A questionable reference is made to example (c) in Official Comment Three to § 3-403-"Peter
Pringle, by Arthur Adams, Agent"-as most closely resembling the signatures in the case.
Id. at 406-07 (dissenting opinion).
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propriate. The dissent (three judges) in the Klausman case
agreed with the trial court.
The second case is First National Bank of Atlanta v. C. & S.
Concrete Structures, Inc.75 In the words of the court, the note,
payable to the plaintiff, was "signed C. & S. Concrete Structures,
Inc. by Vernon Crutcher, President, and G. E. Strickland, Secretary and Treasurer." On the back of the note, the name of the
corporation was repeated, "then followed under appropriate columns information with regard to the loan, such as interest, due
date and amount,"7 and finally the names of the two officers were
signed and titles typed in. The trial judge granted a judgment on
the pleadings for the individual defendants and six of the nine
judges of the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed. The court opinion relied upon section 3-403(3) with little discussion, and cited
Phoenix Air Conditioning Co. v. Pound," which is distinguishable. The three dissenting judges argued that the illogic of a
corporation endorsing its own note presented an ambiguity
necessitating the introduction of parol testimony.
There are three possible solutions to the problems presented
by these two cases. Assuming corporate signatures-both naming
the corporation and indicating representative capacity-appearing on the front and the reverse of a negotiable instrument, the
first solution is to hold that they are both representative signatures as described in section 3-403 and thus the individuals are
not bound and parole evidence is inadmissible to show otherwise. This is the holding of C. & S. Concrete Structures, Inc.
The second solution, applied in the Klausman case, permits parol
evidence in that the multiplicity of signatures introduces an ambiguity. The third and most logical solution, ignored by both
cases, would use the multiplicity of the signatures plus the illogic
of a corporation signing in two places to opt for unambiguous
personal liability of the individual signers.
The proper result in cases of this type should be to recognize
an ambiguity and to permit parol testimony. To argue that there
is an illogic presented which compels a conclusion as a matter of
law is to beg the question. It is obvious that the parties have not
71128 Ga. App. 330, 196 S.E.2d 473 (12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 913) (1973).
76 Id.
7 123 Ga. App. 523, 181 S.E.2d 719 (9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 483) (1971).
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clearly indicated what they were trying to do. The multiplicity of
signatures suggests that the payee anticipated multiple liability.
The use of titles in conjunction with the name of an organization,
however, suggests that the individuals contemplated action in a
representative capacity.
1. Liability of the Unauthorized Signer
One may sign a negotiable instrument in an unauthorized
manner either by forging a signature or by signing in a representative capacity while lacking the authority to bind the purported
principal. In the forgery situation the forger himself arguably is
not liable on the instrument inasmuch as one cannot be liable
unless named. Thus, before the N.I.L., the holder was reduced to
a common law cause of action against the forger.78 Where the case
involved an unauthorized agent, the rule under the N.I.L., by
implication from section 20, was that the unauthorized agent or
representative was personally liable.7" Section 3-404(1) clearly
expresses this rule and also applies it to the forgery situation in
the following language:
Any unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative as that of the person whose name is signed unless he ratifies it or is precluded from
denying it; but it operates as the signature of the unauthorized
signer in favor of any person who in good faith pays the instrument
or takes it for value.

It should be noted that this subsection permits the taker for
value to sue on the note. This results in a judgment based upon
the face value of the note as contrasted with a judgment based
upon damages caused by the lack of authority or forgery. The last
clause of the subsection limits the application of the rule. In the
words of the comment, "[O]ne who knows that the signature was
unauthorized cannot recover . . . . ,Sr In First National Bank of
Elgin v. Achilli,5 ' a note was signed:
HIGHLAND MOTOR SALES (printed by hand)
/s/Ruth Achilli
/s/Howard Achilli
See W. BRITTON, supra note 9, § 166.

"

The leading case is New Georgia Nat'l Bank v. J. & G. Lippman, 222 App. Div.
383, 226 N.Y.S. 233, aff'd., 249 N.Y. 307, 164 N.E. 108 (1928). The language in § 20 of
the N.I.L. was: "(The agent) is not liable on the instrument if he was duly authorized
.... " The implication accepted by most courts was that the individual signer was liable
if unauthorized. Prior to the N.I.L., holders were relegated to an action for breach of an
implied warranty of authority. See W. BarrrON, supra note 9, § 166.
U.C.C. § 3-404, Official Comment Two (1976).
'
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The individual signers appealed a denial of a motion to open a
confessed judgment by the payee. Affidavits indicated that Highland Motor Sales was a sole proprietorship owned by the deceased Sam Achilli and that the signers were sole heirs and
representatives of the estate although not authorized to sign the
note in question. The Illinois appellate court held that the ambiguity present in the signature permitted parol testimony to disestablish individual liability and also held that if the defendants
could establish that the plaintiffs knew that the defendants had
no authority, section 3-404(1) required that the motion to open
the judgment be granted.
Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association v.
Morse"' illustrates that in the corporate situation the question of
authorization can be an important issue. A note was signed in a
representative manner naming the corporation and giving the
titles of the individual signers. However, the state of California
had suspended the corporation's powers for failure to pay state
corporation taxes. Plaintiff-payee argued that section 3-404(1)
applied to bind the unauthorized individual defendants. The
Oregon Supreme Court, applying California law, held that the
effect of suspension of powers under the California statute was to
be distinguished from the effect on a forfeiture of a corporate
charter. Noting that a suspended corporation could not disaffirm
its contracts, the court held that section 3-404(1) did not apply.
This case should be interpreted as holding that the individuals
were not "unauthorized" within the meaning of section 3-404(1).
One statement of the Oregon court must be questioned. In
pointing out that the corporation would be bound, the court unnecessarily said: "Under the Uniform Commercial Code the unauthorized signer of a note can be held liable only if the purported
principal is not bound." There seems to be no basis for this
statement other than a generalized notion of "not having one's
cake and eating it, too." There is no basis in the Code's rules for
this logic.Y The question of the liability of the representative may
turn on ratification. Section 3-404(2) reads: "Any unauthorized
signature may be ratified for all purposes of this Article. Such
14 Il1. App. 3d 1, 301 N.E.2d 739 (13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 505) (1973).
265 Ore. 72, 508 P.2d 194 (12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 520) (1973).
Id. at 81, 508 P.2d at 198 (12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 525).
1 See discussion note 79 supra.
2
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ratification does not of itself affect any rights of the person ratifying against the actual signer." The second sentence of section 3404(2) should be read to permit courts to decide on the facts or
particular cases whether ratification which results in liability of
the party represented will result in release of the unauthorized
signer. Relevant facts to be examined would be the assumptions
of the parties at the time of signing, the circumstances of the
ratification, and the posture of the payee or taker at the time of
the ratification and thereafter.
A recent Colorado case ignored the Uniform Commercial
Code and thus did not reach the question of a difficult application
of section 3-404(1). In MacKay v. Lay, 85 three notes, admittedly
issued for corporate purposes, were signed:
Cert-a-Corporaton
Thomas C. MacKay, President
The trial court found that MacKay had never been duly authorized by the corporation to borrow money on its behalf."8 Other
relevant facts included: First, the payee-plaintiff was dealing
with the corporation and not the individual at all times; second,
the corporation made part payments on the note; and third, the
corporation was insolvent at time of suit. The trial court found
the defendant unauthorized and therefore personally liable.
The Colorado Court of Appeals, surprisingly, made no mention in its opinion of Article Three which is clearly applicable."
In reversing the trial court and ordering a dismissal, the appellate
court applied the rule that if an agent exceeds his authority, his
principal may complain, but a third party may not. It is submitted that this rule is inapposite to the language of section 3-404(1).
The test is whether the signature operated "in favor of any person
who in good faith pays the instrument or takes it for value." The
28 Colo. App. 70, 470 P.2d 614 (1970).
This finding resulted from a correct application of the principle that the person
relying on authority must establish it. See U.C.C. § 3-403(1) (1972). Apparently the
individual defendant in the case was unable to show authorization as required by the bylaws because of casually kept corporate minutes.
" It is possible that the promissory note in question was not negotiable as not complying with U.C.C. § 3-104(1) (1972). The case is silent on the point. However, it is believed
that if one has a nonnegotiable note, there is a strong argument that the rules of §§ 3-403
and 3-404 ought to apply. The reasons for the rules apply equally in the case of negotiable
or nonnegotiable notes. See Agar v. Orda, 264 N.Y. 248, 190 N.E. 479, 258 N.Y.S. 274
(1934).
"

"
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rule states, in effect, that, assuming lack of authority as between
the individual signer and a holder (including a payee) for value
in good faith, the unauthorized signer loses.
The MacKay case could have been decided the same way had
the court faced section 3-404(1). For example, the court could
have held that there was a ratification by the corporation which
the payee took advantage of and that the payee could not take
an inconsistent position. In certain cases, facts constituting
waiver or estoppel might be present which would permit a holding
that the individual is not liable."5 However, the decision in the
MacKay case clearly calls into question the wisdom of the Code
rule of section 3-404(1). It is evident that the Colorado Court of
Appeals did not wish to throw the risk of the insolvency of a
corporate maker upon an innocently unauthorized individual
signer. This is not a new thought. Shortly after the promulgation
of the N.I.L., Dean Ames made the following comment upon the
rule in section 20:
Under this section, an agent signing without authority of the principal is, by implication, liable on the instrument. This is unjust and
a departure from the English Act and the almost uniform current
of judicial decisions by which the agent is liable only on his implied
warranty of authority. According to this rule the measure of damages would be nominal, if the principal should happen to be bankrupt; whereas under sec. 20 it would be the amount of the instrument."

Dean Ames' reference to the difference in effect is correct. Where
the holder sues the unauthorized signer on a breach of the implied
warranty of authority, the damages are limited to those caused
by the breach. When the principal is insolvent, the inability to
w See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1972), which reads: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the
law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause
shall supplement its provisions."
0 Shortly after the promulgation of the N.I.L., which had been quickly drafted by J.
J. Crawford, it was attacked by Dean Ames, one of the leading authorities in the field.
Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law, 14 HARV. L.R. 241 (1900). Judge Brewster, Chairman of the ABA Committee on Uniform Laws, came to its defense. Brewster, A Defense
of the Negotiable Instruments Law, 10 YALE L.J. 84 (1901). The reply from Harvard,
Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law - Necessary Amendments, 16 HAav. L.R. 255
(1903), concluded what is known as the "Ames-Brewster Controversy." See McKeehan,
The Negotiable Instruments Law-A Review of the Ames-Brewster Controversy, 50 AM.
L. REG. 457 (1902). The quote in text is from Beutel's Brannan, supra note 7, at 411.
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collect is not due to the unauthorized signature. Suit under section 20 of the N.I.L. or section 3-404(1) of the U.C.C. gives recovery of the face amount of the instrument (less payments made or
less value of valid defenses). The Code statement of the rule is
too mechanical; recovery should be allowed on the instrument,
but with exceptions. To provide flexibility, the last clause of section 3-404(1) perhaps should read: "But (an unauthorized signature) operates as the signature of an unauthorized signer not acting in good faith in favor of any person who in good faith pays
the instrument or takes it for value."
2.

Failure to Indicate Representative Capacity

The bulk of the cases both before and after the enactment of
the Uniform Commercial Code involve negotiable instruments
bearing a corporate name and personal signature which fails
clearly to indicate representative capacity. Section 3-403(2)(b)
states the mechanical rule that, "except as otherwise established
between the immediate parties, [an authorized representative]
is personally obligated if the instrument names the person represented but does not show ... representative capacity . .. ."
The wisdom of the rule is questionable, at least insofar as the
rule on its face prevents the introduction of parol evidence between remote parties in certain cases of corporate obligations. A
well-reasoned opinion by the unanimous Supreme Court of New
Jersey on clear facts seems a logical starting point for discussion,
even though it is a pre-Code case. In Norman v. Beling,90 a series
of thirty-six notes, each for fifty dollars, was executed to repay
an obligation of the Teal Corporation for services rendered. In the
space for the maker's signature appeared the following:
Teal Corporation [typed]
/s/ J. Harole Semar
/s/ Christopher A. Beling
The notes were negotiated to the plaintiff who the courts assumed
was a holder in due course. The first twenty-one notes to become
due were presented to and paid by the corporation. When the
remainder of the notes went unpaid, plaintiff brought this action
against Beling. The trial court permitted evidence which supported a finding that the individuals were officers of the corpora- 33 N.J. 237, 163 A.2d 129 (1960).
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tion and never intended to bind themselves personally. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed, holding that judgment
should have been rendered for the plaintiff,9 and defendant appealed.
After indicating that section 20 of the N.I.L. offered no answer to the case, the court in Norman v. Beling engaged in a
three-step analysis to hold that the trial court was correct in
permitting evidence of intent. First, the court referred to a number of cases where parol evidence was held admissable as between
the immediate parties when the signature was in the form, "ABC
Corporation, John Doe." Next, the court discussed the applicability of that rule to the fact situation of the instant
case-namely, when the corporate name was followed by two
signatures, both lacking titles. Arguably, the first individual
name is ambiguous in a sense that the second is not because at
least one signature is universally expected to authenticate the
signature of the corporation. But the court refused to distinguish
between the two names, saying, "We do not consider this factor
decisive, however, because it is a frequent occurrence for corporate by-laws to require the signature of two officers on instruments binding the corporation.""2 Lastly, the court applied the
principle allowing parol evidence even though the plaintiff was a
holder in due course. It is the last step in this analysis which
creates the greatest divergence from the bulk of prior cases and
is contrary to the plain language of the above cited Code subsection. The New Jersey court's support of the last step fights a basic
assumption of many cases. The court said, "When a defect by
way of ambiguity is suggested by the face of the instrument the
purchaser is put on inquiry because to ignore such a warning with
impunity has no sound basis. 9 3 Many would argue that the fact
of the ambiguity of the signature should not put the purchaser on
inquiry. Such a rule is felt to "clog negotiability" and thus be
invidious. Both pre-Code and post-Code cases are confused, however, inasmuch as they fail to come to grips with a key question:
What degree of ambiguity is necessary in order to insulate remote
parties from a duty of inquiry? It is apparent that the New Jersey
58 N.J. Super. 575, 157 A.2d 17 (App. Div. 1959).
92

Norman v. Beling, 33 N.J. 237, 244, 163 A.2d 129, 133 (1960). The court referred to

the accounting practice of requiring two signatures. Id.
" Id. at 246, 163 A.2d at 133.
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court in the Beling case felt that a purchaser of notes signed in
the manner presented would most likely assume that the notes
were corporate obligations. It does not seem to clog negotiability
unnecessarily to require the purchaser to inquire for the limited
purpose of personal liability of the signers. After all, there is no
impediment to purchase where the purchaser contemplates only
the purchase of a corporate obligation. It is also apparent that
many of the purchasers (and perhaps even immediate parties)
have questions about personal liability only after the fact, that
is, after the insolvency of the corporate maker. It seems unnecessarily harsh in many cases to hold the corporate officer liable
when the choice is between the corporate officer who admittedly
was somewhat inartful in the manner of his signing and the holder
of an instrument who made no simple inquiries at the time of
execution or purchase.
As between immediate parties, it is clear under section 3403(2)(b) that where a signature is simply in the form,
ABC Corporation,
John Doe,
parol evidence is admissable to establish that John Doe was not
intended to be personally bound, and the cases so hold. 4 Norman
v. Beling involved remote parties and thus is changed by the
Code. No case has followed Beling.15 Three cases decided under
the Code have reasonably indistinguishable facts from Beling in
that a note was signed with the name of a corporation followed
by the signatures of one or two individuals, and the plaintiff was
a remote party suing an individual signer. All of the cases hold
contra to Beling." Distinguishable from Beling are cases where an
" Speer v. Friedland, 276 So.2d 84 (12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 509) (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1973); First Nat'l Bank v. Achilli, 14 Il1. App. 3d 1, 301 N.E.2d 739 (13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
505) (1973); Weather-Rite, Inc. v. Southdale Pro-Bowl, Inc., 301 Minn. 346, 222 N.W.2d
789 (15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 669) (1974); Chips Distributing Corp. v. Smith, 48 Misc. 2d
1079, 266 N.Y.S.2d 488 (3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 177) (Sup. Ct. 1966); North Carolina Equip.
Co. v. DeBruhl, 28 N.C. App. 330, 220 S.E.2d 867 (18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1011) (1976);
Viajes Iberia, S.A. v. Dougherty, 87 S.D. 591, 212 N.W.2d 656 (13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1096)
(1973).
, Certain cases decided independently of the U.C.C. under "Bad Check" statutes do
accord with Beling. See Southeastern Fin'l. Corp. v. Smith, 397 F. Supp. 649 (17 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 1043) (N.D. Ala. 1975) and ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 131(1) (Supp. 1973).
" Perez v. Janota, 107 Il.App. 2d 90, 246 N.E.2d 42 (6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 357) (1969)
(one signature); O.P. Ganjo, Inc. v. Tri-Urban Realty Co., 108 N.J. Super. 517, 261 A.2d

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 55

officer has signed a note twice, once without designation of office
and once with the designation. 7 In this case, the second personal
signature without the designation of representative capacity removes any ambiguity and the individual signer is liable.
One group of cases, which were correctly decided under the
Code, can be distinguished from Beling. An example is
Lumbermen Associates, Inc. v. Palmer,"'where a corporate note
was issued to the plaintiff and signed by the individual defendant
on the back of the note without using the name of the corporation.
Here, arguably, the "instrument names the party represented,"
in that the individual signed for the corporation on the front,
using title and name of the party represented. The court properly
held that the individual was liable as an indorser." Other cases
support the idea that the facts of the signing rather than an
automatic application of section 3-403(2) should be decisivie.1'"
The true explanation of the cases is that the total appearance of
the note, front and back, presents no ambiguity. A corporate note
signed with an authorized representative signature on front and
the unadorned name of an individual on the back can suggest
only one explanation: An individual was lending his or her credit
to the obligation expressed on the front. The ambiguity of multiple signatures with representative capacity indicated, front and
back,' 0 1 is not present in this category of cases.
Two decisions in this group can be distinguished. In
722 (7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 302) (1969) (one signature); Abby Fin'l. Corp. v. S.R.S. Second
Ave. Theatre Corp. (11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1011) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972) (two signatures).
" See, e.g., Gramatan Co. v. MBM, Inc., (6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 865) (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1968) where the note was signed:
MBM, Inc.
by-Janet Meyerson, Pres.
JM-Janet Meyerson
MM-Milton B. Mejias, Sec.
Milton B. Mejias.
" 344 F. Supp. 1129 (11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 359) (E.D. Pa. 1972).
" The court summarily referred to PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 3-402, which provides,
"Unless the instrument clearly indicates that a signature is made in some other capacity
it is an indorsement." This is inapposite in that the section determines what liability the
signature imports, (see, U.C.C. § 3-414(1) (1972), setting forth the condition liability of
the indorser) and not whose liability is set forth.
"I Other cases with similar facts are: Agfa-Gevaert, Inc. v. Bueding, 11 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 794 (Md. 1972); Central Trust Co. v. J. Gottermeier Dev. Co., 65 Misc. 2d 676, 319
N.Y.S.2d 25 (8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1297) (1971).
IO See text accompanying note 74 supra.
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Southern National Bank v. Pocock 12 an instrument was signed on
the front by the corporation in an unambiguous manner, but "Ian
I. Pocock, Pres." appeared on the reverse under a printed
"Guaranty of Third Persons."' 13 The trial court had admitted
testimony from the plaintiff-payee and the defendant Pocock as
to the circumstances surrounding the signing and the jury had
found for the plaintiff. Citing section 3-403(2)(b), the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that evidence was admissible as between the immediate parties but held that there was sufficient
evidence to justify the jury verdict and denied the appeal by the
defendants. A signing even more demonstrative of the need for
parol evidence is found in National Bank v. Ament. 0 4 The front
of the note had three blank lines. On the first line appeared "R
& A Concrete" and on the second line appeared the handwritten
"By: Grover Roberts." The latter name was typed below the signing so that the last blank on the note was partially filled. On the
reverse of the note appeared "John Ament, Sec. & Treas." The
trial judge dismissed as to Ament in a suit by the payee. On
appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals, citing section 3-403(2)(b),
held that the jury should "consider all of the circumstances of his
signing, including the facts that the complete, correct name of the
corporate defendant-maker was not utilized; that Ament indorsed the note on its reverse side, rather than on the line for
maker on the face of the note; and that he (or someone else) may
have considered that there was insufficient space in which to
indorse on the face of the note."' 5 The court is correct in permitting parol evidence to solve the ambiguity. A strong indication of
ambiguity exists in that one could ask why only the "Sec. &
Treas." would sign for accommodation and not the other executives. The facts of this case would give extreme difficulty to a
court were the plaintiff a remote party. The clear application of
section 3-403(2)(b) to deny the admissibility of parol evidence
29 N.C. App. 52, 223 S.E.2d 518 (19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 565) (1976).
10 The instrument executed was a "Security Agreement" which on the face included
1*

the note and chattel mortgage and on the reverse contained a printed guaranty agreement.
Obviously, this instrument would not qualify as Article Three paper under U.C.C. § 3104(1) (1972), but the court without discussion applied U.C.C. § 3-403 (1972). The rule of
the section can appropriately be applied to nonnegotiable instruments. See note 87 supra
and accompanying text.
104127 Ga. App. 838, 195 S.E.2d 202 (1973).
0 Id. at 839, 195 S.E.2d at 202-03.
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would seem to work an injustice. Again, it would seem that the
remote purchaser should be on notice that possibly the signature
on the reverse was only a continuation of the signature on the
front. Suppose, for example, it were shown that the corporate bylaws required two signatures to authenticate a corporate undertaking on a note of this kind.
In spite of the perhaps beguiling reasoning of the Beling opinion, the Code seems to clearly favor the remote party where the
individual signer has named the party represented, but has inadvertently omitted the designation of capacity or office. As indicated, the few cases decided under the Code apply the rule holding the individual liable. But the Code rule in the "ABC Corp.,
John Doe" context is too rigid; splits of authority may develop
where courts find fact situations that denote equities in favor of
the Beling result.
3.

Failure to Name the Party Represented

As indicated above, the 1956 version of section 3-403 overturned the majority rule in favor of the New York rule of
Megowan v. Peterson.' Where the signature is simply in the
form, "John Doe, Pres." or "Charles Peterson, Trustee," without
naming the party represented, parol evidence is admissible as
between immediate parties to disestablish personal liability, but
not as to remote parties. As to remote parties, the individual
signer is personally liable. Very few of the cases litigated under
the Code present fact patterns like Megowan. Conjecturally, this
is explainable in that the issue is clear cut under the Code. However, perhaps the paucity of cases reflects the fact that such a
signature form is rarely used. It is so ambiguous on its face that,
even at the time of signing, one or both of the immediate parties
would surely move to cure the ambiguity.
One case, Kramer v. Johnson,107 does present the issue
squarely. In that case, a note was signed:
Leo W. Palmer, Governor
George W. Johnson, Secy.
Hubert C. Alligood.
'
',

See text accompanying note 20 supra.
121 Ga. App. 848, 176 S.E.2d 108 (7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1335) (1970).
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The note did not name the corporation. The Georgia Court of
Appeals, citing Megowan v. Peterson and section 3-403(2)(b),
held that parol evidence was admissible between the immediate
parties to disprove personal liability. Kramer is interesting in
that it is one of the few cases, if not the only one, where a question
is raised by the facts as to the meaning of "immediate parties."
The plaintiff in that case was the transferee of the payee bank
and her deceased husband was an indorser. The court assumed
without discussion that she was an immediate party.
The cases very properly have little discussion as to the meaning of the term "immediate parties." The rule does not need to
permit parol as between the principal and agent as to authority.
The problem to which section 3-403 responds is the liability of the
signers to the takers of instruments. Where a taker has dealt with
the agent or officer, the taker is obviously an "immediate party."
The immediate party is almost always the payee of the instrument. A purchaser from the payee, often a holder in due course,
is a remote party.
4.

Authorized Signatures on Checks

Article Three of the Uniform Commercial Code applies to
notes, drafts, checks, and certificates of deposits." 8 The sections
which I have discussed apply to "signatures" or "instruments."'0 9
Thus, logically, there is no reason to treat the problem of signatures on checks any differently than the problem of signatures on
notes. However, one apparently significant fact of life is ignored
by section 3-403: Many corporate or other organization checks are
issued routinely without the clear signature form of "ABC Corporation, Jane Doe, Treas." 0 The cases therefore need explaining.
It is submitted that it is no answer to the problem to say that
U.C.C. § 3-104(2) (1972).
U.C.C. § 3-102(1)(e) (1972) defines "Instrument" as meaning a negotiable instrument, and U.C.C. § 3-104 (1972) sets forth the requirements of a "negotiable instrument
within this Article .... "
110Unfortunately, there is no survey or empirical study known to this writer measuring the exact magnitude of this fact. However, in the last several years of teaching this
subject, I have been amazed at the number of organizational checks I have seen where
the signature of the drawer is simply a handwritten, stamped, or printed name of an agent
without designation of representative capacity. My salary checks come in that form. I have
also received a check from a municipality in a land sale transaction and a check from my
stock brokers in that form. Numberless checks have been shown to me by my students
over the years similarly subject to the problem of the cases discussed here.
"'
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compliance with section 3-403 will resolve the question. The question, properly put, is: Should executing corporate obligations in
the commonly accepted manner expose the authorized signer to
liability?
Perhaps the best known case, Pollin v. Mindy Manufacturing
Co., I"presents the problem with startling clarity. In September
of 1966, Mindy Manufacturing Company issued a number of payroll checks" 2 and cashed some $2,252 of these indorsed checks for
a small fee. Before the checks were paid by the drawee bank, that
bank had exhausted the payroll account because of a demand
note of Mindy's held by the bank. Plaintiffs, probably holders in
due course and undoubtedly remote parties, brought suit against,
inter alia, Robert Apfelbaum, who had signed the checks without
a designation that he was President 3 of Mindy Manufacturing.
Summary judgment against the individual defendant was entered by the lower court, based on the clear language of section
3-403(2)(b).
A description of the checks in question is given by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the appeal:
The checks ... are boldly imprinted at the top, Mindy Mfg. Co.,
Inc., 26th & Reed Streets, Philadelphia, Penna. 19146 - Payroll
Check No. -, and also Mindy Mfg. Co., Inc., is imprinted above
two blank lines appearing at the lower right hand comer; also on the
lower left hand corner appears Continental Bank and Trust Company, Norristown, Pa., in type. Under the imprinted name of the
corporate defendant, on the first line, appears the signature of defendant Robert L. Apfelbaum without any designation of office or
capacity ...."'

The court properly pointed out that in an action by a remote
party against the signer, to avoid personal liability under section
3-403(2), not only must the representative be named, but there
must be a showing that "the representative signed in a represent211 Pa. Super. Ct. 87, 236 A.2d 542 (4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 827) (1967).
The opinion says no more about the character of the plaintiffs. In a generalized
fact pattern of the problem we should be able to hypothesize professional check-cashing
services, liquor stores, grocery stores, loan companies (when monthly payments are made),
or cashing banks as the plaintiffs.
"' Were the reader to be pleased that the individual made liable was the "Big Gun"
of a close corporation, put the generalized fact pattern in terms of the defendant's being
a salaried clerk, secretary, treasurer, or other agent of the insolvent corporation. Perhaps,
his or her check also "bounced."
"' Pollin v. Mindy Mfg. Co., 211 Pa. Super. Ct. 87, 89-90, 236 A.2d 542, 544 (1967).
"'
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ative capacity." Admitting that the instrument failed to show the
office held by the signer, the court went further:
However, we do not think this is a complete answer to our problem,
since the Code imposes liability on the individual only ". . . if the
instrument . . . does not show that the representative signed in a
representative capacity . . ." [sic] This implies that the instrument

must be considered in its entirety."'

The court then went on to hold that this requirement of the Code
had been met, considering the entire instrument. The court
pointed out the distinction between a note and a check, the fact
that there was a double line beneath the printed "MINDY MFG.
CO.," and that the check clearly showed that it was "payable
from a special account set up by the corporate defendant for the
purposes of paying its employees.""'
The logic of the Pollin decision should be accepted under
section 3-403. It is one of the few cases which underscore the
necessity of examining the entire instrument to determine
whether there is a signature in a representative capacity. The
approach of the Pollincourt is to make the rather wooden formula
of section 3-403 more flexible and fact-responsive. It is conjectural
whether this approach will ever be extended to the promissory
note cases. One might argue that the promissory notes which
have been litigated have not presented characteristics analogous
to those on a payroll check." 7
Surprisingly, in view of the enormous number of corporate
checks issued daily, there are only two cases which may be said
to follow Pollin."s s Bennett v. McCann"' involved a series of
checks signed, "McCann Industries, Inc., Payroll Account, /s/
J.Y. McCann." Without discussion, and citing only Pollin and
the Code, the court said, "The petition clearly shows that this
12
was the corporation's liability and not that of an individual."' 0
The case is distinguishable in that the suit was by the payee of
the checks rather than a remote party. However, the decision was

"'
''

"'

IId. at 91, 236 A.2d at 544-45 (emphasis added).
Id. at 92, 236 A.2d at 545.
But see discussion of Beling case in text accompanying notes 90-97 supra.
Bennett v. McCann, 125 Ga. App. 393, 188 S.E.2d 165 (10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 851)

(1972); Bailey v. Polster, 468 S.W.2d 105 (9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 611) (Tex. Ct. App. 1971).
"I

Bennett v. McCann, 125 Ga. App. 393, 188 S.E.2d 165 (10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 851)

(1972).

I-Id. at 393, 188 S.E.2d at 165-66 (10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 851).
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an affirmance of the granting of a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, which is tantamount to holding that parol evidence is inadmissible because the checks were, unambiguously, only a corporate obligation. Bailey v. Polster" is distinguishable on its facts
and in its procedural setting, but does rely upon Pollin. The instrument was an insurance draft drawn on the insurance company. The action was a suit in equity by the payee to enforce a
compromise settlement of a personal injury case. The court, of
course, had no problem in holding the company as the drawer of
the draft, but the claim against the agent was predicated upon
the fact that the agent signed the draft "as the ostensible drawer
without anything under his signature to indicate the capacity in
which he was acting.""' The Texas Court of Civil Appeals held
that section 3-403 of the Code should not be applied "to fix personal liability on an employee of an insurance company who is
hired to pay approved claims ....The true relationship between
the parties was clearly shown by undisputed evidence."'' 3
Some ten years after the date of the Pollin case, there seems
to be little judicial motivation to extend the decision beyond the
precise facts of that case. The Texas Supreme Court distinguished Pollin in Griffin v. Ellinger.2 4 In that case, payee sued
on a check drawn on a standard check form.' 2 5 The name
"Gateway Bldg. Co., Inc.," below which was an address, appeared in the upper left-hand corner of the check. A single blank
line in the lower right-hand corner bore the handwritten signature
of the defendant with no indication of representative capacity.
The amount of the check, $1,310, had been stamped on the check
by a "check protector"'' 26 which imprinted not only the amount
of the check but the company's name. The lower court admitted
evidence on the issue of personal liability and found against the
defendant. The defendant appealed, alleging that the instrument
' 468 S.W.2d 105 (9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 611) (Tex. Ct. App. 1971). Interestingly
enough, the case also cites Norman v.Beling for its holding. See text accompanying notes
90-97 supra.
,2 Bailey v. Polster, 468 S.W.2d at 109 (9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 614) (Tex. Ct. App.
1971).
InId.
' 19 Tex. S. Ct. J. 340, 538 S.W.2d 97 (19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 587) (1976).
" The case is one of the few which reproduces the form of the instrument as executed.
Id. at -,
538 S.W.2d at 99 (19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 589).
I" Id., 538 S.W.2d at 99 (19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 589).

CORPORATE SIGNATURES

1978

showed conclusively on its face that he was signing in a representative capacity. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court
action. Defendant's contention that the "check protector" imprint should control was rebuffed: "Although the stamp clearly
reveals the name of the principal, it does not aid petitioner because it gives no information as to the capacity in which he signed
the instrument." (Emphasis supplied by the court.)' 27 Griffin is
distinguishable from Pollin in the degree to which the check in
each case evidenced a purely corporate character. However, it is
submitted that the check protector imprint on a corporate name
included ought to be as indicative as the legend "Payroll Account." The basic difference between the two cases is that the
Pollin court focused on the "instrument as a whole," whereas the
Griffin court focused on form of the signature and found no indication of representative capacity.
The logic of section 3-403(2)(b) can present a court with a
"Catch 22" situation. An instrument such as was presented in
either Ellinger or Pollin may persuade a court to introduce evidence as between the immediate parties to resolve the ambiguity
and this result should not be criticized. However, such a holding
leads inexorably to the result that the individual signer is personally liable to remote parties and parol evidence is inadmissible to
avoid such liability. Thus, if the Griffin and Pollin cases-the
first between immediate parties, the second between remote-involved the same instrument or indistinguishable instruments, the two results could not logically coexist. Why does the
Code rule exclude the factual possibility of instruments which on
their face present ambiguity necessitating parol evidence between the parties and also prevent evidence of "corporateness"
which ought to permit an authorized signer to resist unexpected
personal liability as to remote parties?
An unexplained amendment in 1966 to the Official Comment
Three of Section 3-403 may indicate that the U.C.C. Permanent
Editorial Board is less than sure about the matter being discussed
here.' 8 Prior to 1966, Comment Three listed a number of possible
forms of signature. The last two were
'

Id. at

"ISee

__,

538 S.W.2d at 99 (19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 590).

PERMANENT EDrrORIAL BOAM

3 at 25 (1967).
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Peter Pringle
Arthur Adams.
Peter Pringle Corporation
Authur Adams.

The Comment in discussing case (e) explained that the section
admits parol evidence as between immediate parties and adds:
"Case (f) is subject to the same rule." The revised Comment in
1966 deleted case (f) and the reference thereto. There is no explanation for the change. Perhaps the Permanent Editorial Board
has become aware of the fact that corporate signatures present
different parol evidence problems than simple principal-agency
situations.
In another context, American Exchange Bank v. Cessna' 9
does present a check case involving remote parties which is distinguishable from both Pollin and Griffin. In that case, the instrument was a standard form check with the legal "Cessna
Ranch" and an address in the lower left-hand corner. The individual defendant signed without indicating representative capacity and, when sued by a remote party, attempted to show that the
check represented a corporate obligation and that Cessna Ranch
was a California corporation. The court applied section 3403(2)(b) to exclude the evidence. In this case, the ambiguity
should favor the remote party because the remote party had no
reason to know whether "Cessna Ranch" was a sole proprietorship, a trade name, a partnership, or a corporation. Even using
the instrument-as-a-whole test of the Pollin decision, there is
nothing to warn a purchaser that the check is a corporate rather
than a personal obligation.
CONCLUSION

The counseling suggestions are obvious. And it is obvious
that counseling suggestions are neeeded. Where the instrument
is a promissory note and it is not intended that the individual
signers be liable, the form of the signature should be
ABC Corporation,
by, /s/ Jane Doe, Pres.
by, /s/ Richard Roe, Treas.
All signatures should be in close proximity to each other. The use
1" 386 F. Supp. 494 (N.D. Okla. 1974).
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of the word "by" is recommended, under the principle that careful counseling reduces the chance of litigation, but, as has been
indicated, it is not essential. Where the instrument is a promissory note and it is intended that the individual signers be liable,
the recommended form is:
ABC Corporation,
By, /s/ Jane Doe, Pres.
By, /s/ Richard Roe, Treas.
and, as individuals with liability,
/s/ Jane Doe,
/s/ Richard Roe.
The above signature form would bind the individuals as comakers. In the event that the individuals bargained for the secondary liability of indorsers, 31 the individuals should sign on the
reverse of the note without designation of office or other representative capacity.
The counseling suggestion with respect to checks is likewi,
simple, but it must be borne in mind that most corporate checks
are on printed forms. Thus, clients should be urged to include in
the printing process appropriate notations which would save an
individual signer from unexpected liability, as in the Pollin case.
It is best that the printed check form include under the line for
the signature of the drawer appropriate words indicating representative capacity to avoid inadvertent omissions. Thus, where
the treasurer is authorized to sign, the printed word "Treasurer"
would appear beneath the individual's signature. In many factual
situations more than one officer or employee of a corporate entity
may be authorized to draw checks for corporate obligations. If
such is the case, the legend below the drawer's signature line
could read "Authorized Signature," or words to that effect. While
to my knowledge the matter has not been litigated, it would be
surprising for a court to hold 'that where the corporation was
named on the check and the individual's signature was followed
by the words "Authorized Signature," such a signature was not
a representative signature within the meaning of section 3-403(3).
"

See U.C.C. § 3-414 (1972) for the contract of an indorser.

